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In this short paper we study a competing vertical hierarchies model where the allocation of residual claimancy is 
endogenous and is determined jointly with production and contractual decisions. We .nd a set of circumstances in 
which the (equilibrium) allocation of residual claimancy is affected by competition in a non trivial manner. More 
precisely, although revenue-sharing contracts foster agents. (non-contractible) surplus enhancing effort, we show 
that competing principals dealing with exclusive and privately informed agents might still prefer to retain a share of 
the surplus from production when dealing with inefficient types. This is because reducing the surplus share of 
inefficient types reduces the information rent given up to efficient types. Hence, the equilibrium allocation of 
residual claimancy follows a pro-cyclical rule. 
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Residual claimancy plays an important role in models with decentralized decision making. The agency
literature has explored various aspects related to this issue. For instance, by studying the link between
input versus output monitoring and the choice of residual claimancy ￿ see, e.g., Khalil and Lawaree (1995)
and Maskin and Riley (1985) ￿ or by emphasizing the bene￿cial e⁄ect of revenue-sharing contracts on
managers￿incentives to perform non-contractible tasks ￿ see, e.g., Hart (1995).
Existing models, however, mainly consider a single principal-agent set-up, and are silent on the link
between competitive forces (e.g., product market competition) and the allocation of residual claimancy
within ￿rms. Does competition a⁄ect the way organizations distribute the surplus from production across
their members? We address this issue within a competing vertical hierarchies model where the equilibrium
allocation of residual claimancy is endogenous and is jointly determined with production and contractual
decisions. Our objective is to derive basic insights on the interaction between market forces and organization
design under asymmetric information.
We consider a model ￿ la Martimort (1996) where two uninformed principals deal with a pair of
exclusive agents. Each agent is privately informed about his production costs (type) and produces a
veri￿able (contractible) output in his principal￿ s behalf. In addition, each agent exerts a surplus-enhancing
e⁄ort which is non-veri￿able in court ￿ i.e., contracts are incomplete. Production generates externalities
across the two principal-agent pairs (hierarchies), which can be either positive ￿ i.e., outputs are (strategic)
complements ￿ or negative ￿ i.e., outputs are (strategic) substitutes. Agents￿types are allowed to be
correlated. Principals o⁄er direct revelation mechanisms that specify type-dependent surplus-sharing rules
in addition to output decisions and (direct) monetary transfers. Contracts are secret and hence have no
strategic value whatsoever.1
Within this context, we identify two e⁄ects that shape the equilibrium allocation of residual claimancy.
On the one hand, by sharing the surplus from production with her agent, a principal is able to increase
the agent￿ s non-contractible e⁄ort, which makes (ceteris paribus) production more appealing: a surplus-
enhancing e⁄ect. This e⁄ect is standard in models with incomplete contracts: it echoes the insights of the
property rights approach ￿ see, e.g., Hart (1995, Ch. 3) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Ch. 11) ￿
showing that revenue-sharing contracts are desirable insofar as they provide the right incentives to exert
(non-contractible) e⁄ort into a project. On the other hand, when agents￿costs are correlated, rewarding
an agent with a share of the ￿rm￿ s surplus (revenues) generates an informational externality that a⁄ects
the rent grabbed by e¢ cient types. This e⁄ect emerges only if there are production externalities across the
hierarchies. In particular, when residual claimancy is endogenous ￿ i.e., it is part of the deal o⁄ered by a
principal to her agent ￿ the incentive of e¢ cient types to manipulate their costs depends not only on the
cost-saving rent that this strategy secures ￿ i.e., to receive a higher transfer ￿ but also on its e⁄ect on the
￿rm￿ s expected surplus through the competitive channel. Essentially, when a share of the ￿rm￿ s surplus is
1Fersthman and Judd (1987), Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Sklivas (1987) and Vickers (1995) among others, studied
the conditions under which revenue-sharing contracts are o⁄ered at the equilibrium of games where contractual o⁄ers are
observable, and thus have a commitment value. This standard strategic e⁄ect is not present in our framework.
2allocated to the agent directly through the contract o⁄er, the agent￿ s incentive to overstate his cost must
weight the e⁄ect that this lie produces on the principal￿ s beliefs about the rival agent￿ s type, which in turn
a⁄ects the surplus that the principal expects to share with the agent, and hence the monetary incentives
she is willing to o⁄er: a so called competing-contracts e⁄ect (Martimort, 1996).
We show that, although e¢ cient types are always made full residual claimants of the ￿rms￿surplus, if
costs are positively (resp. negatively) correlated and outputs are strategic complements (resp. substitutes)
principals may wish to retain a share of the ￿rm￿ s surplus when dealing with ine¢ cient types for rent-
extraction reasons. In these cases sharing revenues with ine¢ cient agents increases the mimicking incentives
of e¢ cient types. By contrast, if costs are positively (resp. negatively) correlated and outputs are strategic
substitutes (resp. complements) full residual claimancy is granted to the agents regardless of their types.
In these cases allocating a share of the ￿rm￿ s surplus to the agent invariably reduces his rents.
Hence, the model shows that the allocation of residual claimancy is a⁄ected by competition in a non-
trivial manner and that principals are more inclined to share revenues with e¢ cient types (i.e., in good
times) rather than with ine¢ cient ones (i.e., in bad times): a pro-cyclical pattern. This result adds to
the existing literature in three main respects. First, it extends the competing-contracts e⁄ect introduced
in Martimort (1996) who considered the case of perfectly correlated types to a more general context
in which correlation is not perfect and can be negative. Second, one additional insights of this paper
is that once residual claimancy is endogenous, it can potentially play an important role in the welfare
comparison between di⁄erent organizational modes ￿ e.g., common agency versus exclusive deals. Third,
it shows that, in addition to considerations regarding the type of screening instruments controlled by
principals, competitive forces may contribute to determine the way contracting counterparts share the
surplus generated by their relationship via explicit contingent claims on ￿rms￿revenues.
Finally, our results also o⁄er simple ready to use guidelines for interpreting and designing future empir-
ical investigations on the link between organization design and competition. Although we will develop the
arguments in an abstract principal-agent setting, our analysis can be used to study many standard appli-
cations. For instance, it can be used to explain why managerial compensations involve bonuses that vary
along the cycle; it may help explaining the rationale of revenue-sharing contracts in models of competing
supply chains; and it also provides a few insights on the trade-o⁄ between equity and debt contracts in
lending relationships where (exclusive) borrowers compete on the product market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the setting. Section 3 analyzes the
complete information benchmark. Section 4 derives the equilibrium characterization under asymmetric
information. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Set-up
Players. There are two (female) principals, P1 and P2, and two (male) exclusive agents, A1 and A2. Agent
Ai (i = 1;2) produces output qi in Pi￿ s behalf. Firm i￿ s surplus from production is Si(ei;qi;qj). Players
3are risk neutral. Principal Pi￿ s utility is:
V i(:) = (1 ￿ ￿i)Si(ei;qi;qj) ￿ ti; i;j = 1;2 i 6= j;
where qi is the output produced by Ai, ti is the monetary transfer ￿ owing from Pi to Ai, ei is a non-
contractible surplus-enhancing e⁄ort exerted by Ai and ￿i 2 [0;1] denotes the share of the surplus Si (:)
that Pi (eventually) allocates to Ai ￿ i.e., ￿i measures the extent to which Ai is made residual claimant
of ￿rm-i￿ s surplus. Hence, Ai￿ s utility is:
Ui (:) = ti ￿ ￿iqi ￿   (ei) + ￿iSi(ei;qi;qj); i;j = 1;2 i 6= j;
where the parameter ￿i 2 ￿i ￿ ￿ (i = 1;2) denotes Ai￿ s marginal cost of production and is private




. The function   (ei) measures the e⁄ort cost.
Contracts. Contracts are incomplete ￿ i.e., Pi cannot condition the contract o⁄ered to Ai on his e⁄ort ei.
We use the version of the Revelation Principle for competing hierarchies to characterize the equilibrium of
the game ￿ see, e.g., Martimort (1996). Hence, Pi o⁄ers to Ai a direct revelation mechanism:
Ci ￿ fti (mi);qi (mi);￿i (mi)gmi2￿
that maps Ai￿ s report mi about ￿i into a monetary transfer ti (mi), an output qi (mi) and a share of surplus
￿i (mi):2 Contracts are secret: neither Pj nor Aj can observe Ci. Notice that, the mechanism Ci looks like
a revenue-sharing contract as long as ￿i (￿i) 6= 0 for some ￿i.3
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
￿ (T=1) Agents privately observe their costs.
￿ (T=2) Principals (simultaneously) o⁄er contracts.
￿ (T=3) Agents choose e⁄orts, produce and payments are made.
Each player￿ s outside option is normalized to zero with no loss of insights.
Equilibrium concept. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), with the added
passive beliefs re￿nement ￿ i.e., when an agent is o⁄ered a contract di⁄erent from the one he expects in
2We ruled out the case of relative performance evaluations which would require: (i) contract Ci to be contingent on Aj￿ s
cost parameter ￿j; (ii) lottery contracts that are di¢ cult to enforce in practice ￿ see, e.g., Bertoletti and Poletti (1996) and
(1997) on the issue of ￿rst-best implementation with correlated types and competing hierarchies.
3The commitment and collusive values of revenue-sharing contracts have been analyzed in the traditional IO literature ￿
see, e.g., Fershtman and Judd (1987), Dana and Spier (2001) and Spagnolo (2000). These models assume complete information
and do not provide predictions on the evolution of residual claimancy over the cycle neither on the e⁄ect of cost correlation
and competition on organization design.
4equilibrium, he does not revise his beliefs about the contract o⁄ered to the other agent ￿ see, e.g., Caillaud
et al. (1995), Martimort (1996) and Martin (1993).
Assumptions. The analysis is developed under the following assumptions.
A1 The vector of random variables ￿ =(￿1;￿2) is drawn from a joint cumulative distribution function
with: Pr(￿;￿) = ￿2 +￿, Pr(￿;￿) = Pr(￿;￿) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ and Pr(￿;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)
2 +￿. The marginal
distribution entails: Pr(￿) = ￿ and Pr(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿. Posteriors are computed through the Bayes rule:
Pr(￿j￿) = ￿ +
￿
￿, Pr(￿j￿) = ￿ ￿
￿
1￿￿, Pr(￿j￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ and Pr(￿j￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ +
￿
1￿￿.4
The parameter ￿ is the correlation index between ￿1 and ￿2 ￿ i.e., Pr(￿;￿)Pr(￿;￿) ￿ Pr(￿;￿)2 = ￿.
Hence, ￿ > 0 (resp. <) means positive (resp. negative) correlation between types (when ￿ = 0 types are
uncorrelated, see, e.g., Martin, 1993).5
A2 The surplus function Si (:) is symmetric and quadratic:
S (ei;qi;qj) = ￿ + eiqi + ￿qi ￿ q2
i + ￿qiqj i;j = 1;2 i 6= j: (1)
The e⁄ort cost is quadratic:   (ei) =
e2
i
2￿, with 0 < ￿ < 2.6
Assumption A2 yields single peaked pro￿t functions. The parameter ￿ measures the extent of (strategic)
complementarity (￿ > 0) or substitutability (￿ < 0) between outputs.7
A3 Non-negative probabilities:





￿ 0 , minf(1 ￿ ￿);￿g ￿
p
j￿j if ￿ < 0:
Finally, the next hypothesis rules out countervailing incentives and ensures that outputs are always
positive when uncertainty vanishes ￿ i.e., when ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ! 0.
4See also Dequiedt and Martimort (2010) for a similar type space and probabilistic structure.
5The case of positive correlation captures those instances where ￿rms￿production technologies are a⁄ected by aggregate
factors such as public expenditures in R&D, changes in the ￿scal pressure etc. By contrast, the case of negative correlation
can be useful to capture those situations, such as R&D races, where the technological success of a ￿rm ￿ e.g., a patent which
allows to reduce marginal costs ￿ excludes that of its rivals.
6Quadratic speci￿cations are standard in IO models ￿ see, e.g., Martin (1993), Vives (2000) and Raith (1996) among
many others. However, it can be shown that our predictions remain qualitatively the same with nonlinear surplus functions
and small uncertainty ￿ i.e., when ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ is small. Indeed, our results would be obtained in the limiting case where
Taylor expansions are valid.
7When ￿ is negative one can think of this model as a Cournot competition set-up. When ￿ is positive, instead, it can be
interpreted as a model of price competition where the strategic variables are complements.















3 The complete information benchmark
Before studying the case of asymmetric information, in this section we describe the equilibrium of the game
when costs are common knowledge within each hierarchy ￿ i.e., when each principal observes her own
agent￿ s type but not that of the rival agent.
Lemma 1 If costs are common knowledge within each hierarchy, there exists a unique symmetric PBE such
that agents are full residual claimants of the ￿rms￿surplus and are left with no rents ￿ i.e., ￿￿ (￿i) = 1
8￿i 2 ￿; i;j = 1;2; and:











8￿i 2 ￿; i;j = 1;2 i 6= j;
where q￿ (:) : ￿ ! <++ solves:
￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)q￿ (￿i) + ￿E￿j[q￿ (￿j)j￿i] = ￿i 8￿i 2 ￿; i;j = 1;2 i 6= j:
When principals can fully extract rents, letting the agents be full residual claimants of the ￿rms￿surplus
magni￿es their incentives to exert the non-contractible e⁄ort. Hence, it maximizes equilibrium aggregate
pro￿ts, which will be extracted by the principals via the transfer. This e⁄ect echoes the insights of the
property rights literature ￿ see, e.g., Hart (1995, Ch. 3) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Ch. 11) ￿
which shows that revenue-sharing contracts (or, alternatively, sell-out contracts) are desirable insofar as
they provide the right incentives to invest e⁄ort into a project.
4 Asymmetric information
In this section we consider asymmetric information. Principals must learn their agents￿costs through costly
contracting ￿ i.e., they must give up an information rent in order to screen types. The minimization of
those rents leads to equilibrium outputs and sharing rules that are distorted away from e¢ ciency.
For any cost realization ￿i 2 ￿, let Ai￿ s expected utility (in a truthful equilibrium) be:













6Contract Ci is acceptable by agent Ai if and only if it satis￿es the ex-ante participation constraints:
Ui (￿i) ￿ 0 8￿i 2 ￿:
Moreover, agent Ai truthfully reports his type if and only if the following Bayesian incentive compatibility
constraints hold:












; 8mi 6= ￿i:
Denote by qe (:) : ￿ ! <++ the symmetric output function emerging in a separating PBE. As standard in
the screening literature, we assume that e¢ cient types mimic ine¢ cient ones (this conjecture will be veri￿ed
ex post). Hence, only the participation constraint of the high-cost types and the incentive constraint of
the low-cost types matter ￿ see, e.g., La⁄ont and Martimort (2002, Ch. 2). Formally, the set of incentive
feasible allocation is de￿ned by:
Ui(￿) ￿ 0; (2)
and, under A2:


















Pr(￿jj￿i)[S (ei (￿i);qi(￿i);qe (￿j)) ￿ ￿iqi (￿i) ￿   (ei (￿i)) ￿ Ui (￿i)];
subject to
(2) ￿ (3);
￿i (￿i) 2 [0;1] 8￿i 2 ￿;
ei (￿i) =  0￿1 (￿i (￿i)qi (￿i)) 8￿i 2 ￿:













Hence, (3) can be then rewritten as:









7There are few interesting insights to be learned from the incentive compatibility constraint (4). The
￿rst term on its right-hand side captures the standard information rent that an e¢ cient type enjoys in a
single principal-agent relationship (￿ = 0): a low-cost type is tempted to overstate his cost to negotiate a
higher transfer with his principal. However, the second term captures an informational externality across
the hierarchies that depends not only on the nature of upstream externalities, as re￿ ected by the sign and
magnitude of the parameter ￿, but also on the degree of correlation between types, as re￿ ected by the sign
and magnitude of the parameter ￿: it is a generalized version of the competing-contracts e⁄ect emphasized
in Martimort (1996) who considers the case of perfectly correlated types in a framework where agents are
(by assumption) full residual claimants of the surplus that they share with the principals. In the standard
case where (in equilibrium) e¢ cient types produce more than ine¢ cient ones ￿ i.e., qe (￿) > qe(￿) ￿ this
e⁄ect mitigates (resp. strengthens) Ai￿ s incentive to overstate his type if ￿￿ < 0 (resp. > 0).













subject to ￿i (￿i) 2 [0;1]; ei (￿i) =  0￿1 (￿i (￿i)qi (￿i)) 8￿i 2 ￿:
Using A2, the necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst-order conditions with respect to outputs are:
￿ + 2￿i (￿)qi (￿)￿ ￿ 2qi (￿) + ￿E￿j[qe (￿j)j￿] ￿ ￿i(￿)2qi(￿)￿ = ￿; (5)








Low-cost types￿output is chosen so as to equalize (expected) marginal revenues to marginal costs: the
e¢ cient rule in the standard Bayesian sense. By contrast, high-cost types are forced to produce a downward
distorted output for rent extraction reasons. Note that this distortion increases (resp. decreases) in ￿i(￿)
when ￿￿ > 0 (resp. < 0). Using A2 again, the ￿rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions with respect
to the shares ￿i(￿) and ￿i(￿) are:
￿(1 ￿ ￿i(￿))qi(￿)￿ ￿ ￿i(￿) + ￿i (￿) = 0; (7)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿i(￿))qi(￿)￿ ￿
￿￿(qe(￿)￿qe(￿))
1￿￿ + ￿i(￿) ￿ ￿i(￿) = 0; (8)
with complementary slackness conditions:
￿i(￿i)￿i(￿i) = 0; ￿i(￿i) ￿ 0 8￿i 2 ￿; (9)
￿i(￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i(￿i)) = 0 ￿i(￿i) ￿ 0 8￿i 2 ￿; (10)
where ￿(￿i) and ￿(￿i) are the multipliers associated with the inequality constraints ￿i (￿i) ￿ 0 and
8￿i (￿i) ￿ 1, respectively.
Proposition 1 Assume (A1)-(A4) and that ￿￿ is small enough. There exists a unique symmetric PBE
such that ￿e (￿) = 1 and
￿ ￿e(￿) = 1 if and only if ￿￿ ￿ 0;
￿ ￿e(￿) 2 (0;1) if and only if ￿￿ > 0, with
￿￿(￿) ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿(2￿￿￿￿)￿￿
￿(￿￿￿)(1￿￿)(￿(￿￿1)2(2￿￿)￿￿￿):
Moreover, the solution of the relaxed program P also solves the general program.
There are two forces that shape the equilibrium allocation of residual claimancy. First, since agents
choose their e⁄ort to equalize the marginal bene￿t ￿iqi to the marginal cost of e⁄ort  0 (ei), a higher ￿i
promotes more e⁄ort and thus increases the surplus that Pi and Ai share in equilibrium. Second, as shown
by the incentive constraint (4), the allocation of residual claimancy also changes the agents￿mimicking
incentives via the generalized competing-contracts e⁄ect. To understand the logic of this e⁄ect two di⁄erent
cases must be considered.
Case 1: ￿￿ < 0. Suppose ￿rst that ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0. Because types are positively correlated, Ai anticipates
that if he overstates his cost, Pi will believe that Aj is more likely to be ine¢ cient too and that, ceteris
paribus, hierarchy-i￿ s expected surplus is high because outputs are strategic substitutes. But this belief
will induce Pi to reduce the monetary transfer ￿ owing to Ai.
Next, assume that ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 0. Because types are negatively correlated, Ai anticipates that if
he overstates his cost, Pi will believe that Aj is less likely to be ine¢ cient too and that, ceteris paribus,
hierarchy-i￿ s expected surplus is high because outputs are strategic complements. Again, this belief induces
Pi to reduce the monetary transfer ￿ owing to Ai.
In both cases the informational externality created by the interaction between competition and types￿
correlation goes in the same direction of the e⁄ort-enhancing e⁄ect. Hence, it is optimal to award full
residual claimancy to the agents regardless of their costs.
Case 2: ￿￿ > 0. Suppose ￿rst that ￿ < 0 and ￿ < 0. Because types are negatively correlated, Ai anticipates
that if he overstates his cost, Pi believes that Aj is less likely to be ine¢ cient too and that, ceteris paribus,
hierarchy-i￿ s expected surplus is low (because outputs are strategic substitutes). This will, in turn, induce
Pi to increase the monetary transfer ￿ owing to Ai in order to compensate him for the reduction of surplus
induced by a tougher competitor.
Next, assume that ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0. Because types are positively correlated, Ai anticipates that if
he overstates his cost, Pi believes that Aj is more likely to be ine¢ cient too and that, ceteris paribus,
hierarchy-i￿ s expected surplus is low because outputs are complements and Aj is ine¢ cient. But this
induces Pi to increase the monetary transfer ￿ owing to Ai in order to compensate him for the reduction of
surplus due Aj￿ s low (expected) output.
9In both cases there is a trade-o⁄ between the e⁄ort-enhancing e⁄ect of revenue-sharing contracts and
their perverse e⁄ect on the e¢ cient types￿information rent. To balance out those two countervailing forces,
in equilibrium, principals will retain a fraction of the ￿rms￿surplus when dealing with ine¢ cient types.
Of course, if ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 0 there is no competing-contracts e⁄ect whatsoever. Hence, agents are made
full residual claimants of the ￿rms￿revenues as in the complete information benchmark.
5 Conclusion
We showed that the division of surplus between two contracting counterparts might be a⁄ected by com-
petitive forces in a non trivial manner and that residual claimancy might follow a pro-cyclical pattern ￿
i.e., principals are more inclined to share revenues with good types rather than with bad types. This result
adds to the previous theoretical literature and o⁄ers simple ready to use guidelines for interpreting and
designing future empirical investigations on the link between organization design and competition.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Agent Ai chooses the e⁄ort according to the following condition:
e(￿i) = ￿(￿i)q (￿i)￿ 8￿i 2 ￿; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j;
Hence, for any ￿i, principal Pi maximizes
￿ + ￿qi (￿i) + ￿i (￿i)qi (￿)
2 ￿ ￿ qi (￿i)
2 + qi (￿i)￿E￿j[q￿ (￿j)j￿i] ￿ ￿iqi (￿i) ￿
￿￿i(￿i)2qi(￿i)2
2 :
The derivative of this function with respect to ￿i (￿i) is:
qi (￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i (￿i))￿ ￿ 0 8￿i 2 ￿:
Hence, ￿￿ (￿i) = 1 8￿i 2 ￿2 (i = 1;2). The participation constraint is clearly binding, hence the ￿rst order
conditions with respect to outputs are immediately derived from the objective above. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Using the ￿rst-order condition (7) it is straightforward to show that ￿e (￿) = 1.
Hence, under A2 the system of equations that, in an interior solution, identi￿es qe (￿), qe(￿) and ￿e(￿) is
￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qe (￿) + ￿E￿[qe (￿)j￿] = ￿; (A1)














1￿￿ = 0: (A3)
Note that for ￿￿ small, the solution of this system is such that:
￿e(￿)
￿ ￿
￿￿=0 = 1; qe(￿)j￿￿=0 = qe(￿)
￿ ￿
￿￿=0 = q￿ =
￿￿￿
2￿￿￿￿ > 0:
10It then follows that:




qe(￿) ￿ q￿ + ￿￿ lim
￿￿!0
@qe(￿)




Hence, linearizing the system (A1)-(A3) around ￿￿ close to 0, one gets:















































1￿￿ = 0: (A6)

















Hence, for ￿￿ small and ￿￿ > 0, there exists an interior solution ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
< 1, which is also greater than
zero for ￿￿ small. For ￿￿ ￿ 0, instead, the solution involves ￿￿(￿) = 1 ￿ i.e., ￿e(￿) ￿ 0.
Finally, we show that under A4 and for ￿￿ small enough, high-cost types do not ￿nd it convenient to
under-report their type. Hence, the solution of P also solves Pi￿ s general optimization problem.




￿ Ue(￿) ￿ ￿￿qe(￿) ￿
qe(￿)￿e(￿)￿￿(qe(￿)￿qe(￿))
￿(1￿￿) : (A7)



















where, by Proposition 1, ￿e(￿) = 1 for ￿￿ ￿ 0 and ￿e(￿) < 1 for ￿￿ > 0.










(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)





￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿
:
Hence, under A4,
qe(￿) ￿ qe(￿) =
￿(1￿￿)(2￿￿￿￿)￿￿
￿(1￿￿)2(2￿￿)￿￿￿ > 0: (A9)
This directly implies that (A7) holds for ￿￿ > 0 and ￿￿ small enough.
Consider now ￿￿ ￿ 0. The system of equations that de￿nes the equilibrium outputs qe(￿) and qe(￿) is:
￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qe (￿) + ￿E￿[qe (￿)j￿] = ￿;








Taking the di⁄erence between the ￿rst and second equation, using the fact that ￿ = ￿+￿￿, it follows that:
￿(2 ￿ ￿)
￿










from which we immediately have:
qe (￿) ￿ qe(￿) =
￿(1￿￿)￿￿
￿(￿￿1)2(2￿￿)￿￿￿ > 0: (A10)






Hence, the incentive constraint (A7) holds also for ￿￿ ￿ 0.
Hence, the solution of P also solves Pi￿ s general optimization problem. ￿
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